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Abstract: A defining feature of the Northeast Asian developmental state was a focus 
on maximising investment and suppressing growth in consumption. While 
consistently high rates of investment were an integral part of the growth model, as the 
South Korean and Taiwanese economies matured, the viability of this model was 
undermined by the inability of these economies to generate sufficient opportunities 
for profitable investment. At the same time, the legacies of systems of labour control 
associated with the developmental state have impeded the development of stable 
wage-led growth regimes in both political economies. Instead, they have become 
reliant on an unstable combination of current account surpluses and consumer 
borrowing to sustain growth. The legacies of the developmental state continue to 
define many aspects of the political-economic landscape in Korea and Taiwan. 
However, changes in the growth regimes, the reorientation of the financial sectors 
from corporate to household lending, and the downgrading of industrial policy mean 
that it is no longer useful to define Korea or Taiwan as developmental states. Instead, 
contemporary Korea and Taiwan can be best understood as post-developmental states. 
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This article is concerned with changes in the role that investment has played in the 
political economies of South Korean and Taiwanese over the last three decades. 
Changes in their aggregate levels of investment have attracted no real attention 
outside of the economics profession. However, it is our contention that declines in the 
rate of investment in both political economies have played a major role in 
undermining the systems of industrial planning associated with the developmental 
state (DS) and have fundamentally altered the basic function of the financial system. 
In short, the decline in rates of investment has played a key role in shaping broader 
processes of economic and social change in both states. Equally, an understanding of 
the changing role that investment has come to play in the Korean and Taiwanese 
growth models is vital to understanding the economic vulnerabilities both states now 
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face. Changes in rates of investment are not primarily a product of financial 
liberalisation. Rather, they reflect the increasing inability of both economies to 
generate sufficient opportunities for profitable investment to absorb domestic saving.  
 The contribution of this paper is both critical and constructive. A focus on 
rates of investment does not negate the key arguments advanced by critical scholars 
on the rise of neo-liberalism in Northeast Asia and how neo-liberalism has been 
shaped by the legacies of the authoritarian developmental state (Tsai, 2001; Minns, 
2006; Doucette, 2010; Chang, 2012). Nor does it take away from an analysis of how 
global geo-political and economic change has destabilised the developmental state 
(Tsai, 2001; Gills, 2000; Grey, 2011). However, it can add another dimension to this 
analysis. It is impossible to fully understand the growth of household debt in Korea 
and Taiwan or these economies’ increasing dependence on external surpluses without 
analysing changes in rates of investment. The links between rising household debt, 
falling rates of investment and dependency on export surpluses are clear. Aggregate 
demand is the sum of domestic demand for consumption and capital goods plus or 
minus net exports. If rates of investment fall dramatically it follows logically that 
without increases in consumption and/or net exports this will have a major negative 
impact on levels of aggregate demand. In any modern economy the majority of 
consumers receive most of their income in the form of wages. However, in Korea and 
Taiwan we have seen the simultaneous suppression of wages and falls in levels of 
investment. Domestic consumers are not in a position to increase consumption 
without reducing net saving. The fall in investment together with the decline in the 
wages share of national income made it inevitable that Korea and Taiwan would 
become increasingly dependent on household debt and external surpluses to sustain 
aggregate demand.  
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More critically the article seeks to directly challenge the literature that stresses 
the resilience of these developmental states. If we analyse key texts on how the 
Northeast Asian developmental state functioned historically written from both state-
institutionalist and Marxist perspectives, we see agreement that the project involved 
major societal transformation. Furthermore, both approaches have stressed the 
importance of suppressing consumption and maximising investment. Writing from a 
state-institutionalist perspective, Kholi (2004) and Walder (1999) have argued that a 
successful developmental state requires the political marginalisation of the working 
class to ensure that a focus on capital accumulation is not compromised by demands 
for increased consumption. Both Marxist and critical statist scholars see the 
developmental state project as involving a traumatic effort to raise investment levels 
and transform social structures (Hart-Landsberg, 1993; Kohli, 2004; Minns, 2006; 
Chang, 2009). The literature that seeks to define contemporary Korea and Taiwan as 
developmental, on the other hand, takes relatively small-scale industrial promotion 
programmes involving limited resources as evidence of the resilience of 
developmental state structures (Weiss, 2003; Wong, 2005; Chu, 2007; Kim 2012; 
Thurbon, 2016). These definitions are inconsistent and by continuing to define Korea 
and Taiwan as developmental states this literature masks the scale of the changes that 
have taken place in both countries, particularly in terms of the role that investment 
plays in the growth regimes. Contemporary Korea and Taiwan cannot be understood 
as developmental states. That said, it remains important to understand how 
contemporary neo-liberal projects in both states continue to be shaped by the legacies 
of the developmental state. As will be shown, the concept of the post-developmental 
state is useful in helping us better understand the particular features of these political 
economies.  
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In order to advance the arguments regarding the importance of changes in 
levels of investment and the shift from the developmental to the post-developmental 
state, this article is divided into four sections. In the first section, we seek to develop 
relatively coherent definitions of the developmental, neo-liberal and post-
developmental states. The second section focuses on changes that have taken place in 
the Taiwanese political economy since the 1980s. The third section is focused on the 
evolution of the Korean political economy over the same period. The final section 
analyses how the negative social impact of neo-liberal reform and the problems 
associated with transitioning to consumption-led growth have been exacerbated by the 
legacies of the developmental state. The arguments regarding the social impact of 
neo-liberal reform in post-developmental states are not new (see Doucette, 2010; 
Chang, 2012). However, the arguments advanced here regarding how the 
underdevelopment of welfare systems and the weakness of labour organisations have 
impaired the transition to a new sustainable growth regime are more original.  
 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL, NEO-LIBERAL AND POST-DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATES 
 
Any assessment of the resilience of the developmental state in Korea and Taiwan and 
the extent to which these economies have engaged in neo-liberal reform must define 
what it means by neo-liberal and developmental. Furthermore, if we employ the 
concept of the post-developmental state we must seek to define it. It is to these tasks 
we now turn.  
 
The developmental state 
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Fine (2013: ) argues that the “developmental state paradigm” divides into economic 
and political schools. The political school is primarily concerned with questions 
relating to state capacity and how particular forms of state-society relationship 
promote or retard industrial development. The economic school is more focused on 
identifying the policies that promote rapid growth. Perhaps the most influential writer 
within the political school is Evans (1995), who defines the developmental state by its 
bureaucratic capacity and embedded autonomy. To function as an effective agent of 
development the state is seen to require a certain level of bureaucratic capacity and 
coherence. The state must simultaneously maintain a close working relationship with 
capitalists and a capacity to discipline capital. The state must, therefore, be both 
embedded and autonomous. Evans argues that developmental projects may be more 
sustainable in the long-term if the state maintains close relations with multiple social 
groups. Nevertheless, Evans acknowledges the exclusion of groups other than 
capitalists from governing alliances in actually existing developmental states. Other 
scholars working in the statist tradition have explicitly argued that the exclusion of 
other social groups (such as labour, small farmers) is an integral part of the 
developmental state project (see Waldner, 1999; Kohli, 2004).  
 Embedded autonomy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective 
developmental institutions. It is possible to identify state institutions that maintain a 
form of embedded autonomy and aggressively pursue neo-liberal policies. For 
example, the Bank of England has maintained a close relationship with key domestic 
financial institutions in its role as guarantor of financial stability since the 19th 
century. It is clearly “embedded.” Nevertheless, in the 1980s it pursued a policy of 
aggressively removing restrictions on competition that it was fully aware would lead 
to the bankruptcy of an array of domestic firms and ensure the domination of key 
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markets by overseas firms (Moran 1991: 55-87). The central bank sacrificed the 
interests of individual capitalists to its strategic objective of maintaining London as a 
global financial centre. In so doing, it demonstrated its autonomy. However, to the 
best of our knowledge the Bank of England has never been considered a 
developmental institution. We would argue that this is because the Bank simply acted 
to promote, or perhaps even create, global market disciplines. At least implicitly for 
the developmental state paradigm, to be considered developmental, an institution 
must intervene in the economy to achieve an allocation of resources that deregulated 
markets are unlikely to ever effect.  
 In this context Johnson (1983) and Woo (1991) both discusses the importance 
of cheap state-mediated credit in promoting the development of key industries in 
Japan and Korea respectively. Evans (1995) writes extensively of the importance of 
the state’s “midwifery” role in directing capital to nascent industries it believed to 
possess long-term growth potential. As Fine (2013) recognises, the depth of policy 
analysis within the political school is quite limited. However, it is not true to say that 
this school ignores policy questions. Equally, there is extensive cross-referencing 
between the political and economic schools. The differences in these schools’ 
approaches represents a division of labour, with one focusing on institutions and the 
other policy, rather than an intellectual disagreement. 
  The two most influential texts on the Northeast development state authored 
by economists are perhaps Amsden’s (1989) Asia Next Giant on Korea and Wade’s 
(1990) Governing the Market on Taiwan. Amsden (1989) sets out how the Korean 
state used its control of the financial sector to direct capital to industries with high 
long-term growth potential but with relatively low profitability. The state, not price 
signals, determined the direction of investment. At the same time, Amsden (1989: 
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118) highlights Korea’s successes in achieving “one of the highest rates of investment 
in the world.” Gross investment in Korea increased from 10.4% of GDP in 1960 to 
35.8% of GDP during the heavy industrialisation drive in the 1970s (Chung 2007: 
45).  
 According to Wade state control of finance was somewhat less important in 
determining investment flows in Taiwan than Korea. However, between 1951-1980 
the public sector accounted for more than 30% of gross capital formation (Wade 
1990: 177). The state used the chaebol to lead the development of strategic industries. 
The Taiwanese state used publicly owned firms. Partially as a result of investment by 
state owned firms rates of investment in Taiwan were “among the highest in the world 
over an extended period” (Wade 1990: 47). Gross domestic investment in Taiwan 
increased from 13.6% of national income in 1954 to 21% in 1964, to a peak of almost 
40% in 1974 (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2015a: 41). 
 Radical scholars critical of the “developmental state” have not sought to 
contest the importance of state control or high levels of investment in Korean and 
Taiwanese industrialisation. There is not a direct disagreement with the 
developmental state paradigm on the content of policy. Rather, their critique of the 
statist approach focuses on three issues. First, Marxist scholars insist that we clearly 
distinguish between the state’s autonomy from individual businesses and autonomy 
from the capital relation (Chang 2009). The autonomy of the state from the owners of 
capital is an empirical question. However, the modern state is an embodiment of 
broader capitalist social relations. The modern state only comes into existence with 
the separation of the moment of economic appropriation from direct coercion. This 
separation is only possible with the development of a capitalist economy where 
formally free labour meets capital in the marketplace  
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Second, the concept of “national developmental” is critiqued. The idea of 
“national” development is seen to imply a collective interest that, at some level, 
stands above class (Chang 2009: 60-1). If we instead focus on the role of the state in 
promoting capital accumulation we draw attention more clearly to the class nature of 
the state. In addition, there is a need to understand growth not as national but as 
regional and global phenomena. Cumings (1984) argues that industrialisation in 
Korea and Taiwan must be seen as part of a reconstruction of a Japanese-dominated 
regional economy, with Korea and Taiwan becoming sites of relatively low-paid 
production for industries that could no longer operate profitably in Japan. This system 
was based on easy access to the US market, with the US supporting East Asian 
growth to strengthen anti-communist regimes in the region (Woo, 1991; Gills, 2000). 
A different but related argument understands authoritarian state-led development as a 
“semi-peripheral” state form. So, the emergence of the developmental state can only 
be explained with reference to the world system (Song, 2011). The logic of these 
arguments is that the developmental state must be seen as a temporally limited 
project. The external conditions that initially support its functioning will inevitably 
change. Gills (2000: 391-40) argues that the developmental state was undermined by 
US trade pressure and a growing perception by both capitalists and state managers 
that competitiveness depended on the internationalisation of domestic firms.  
If the developmental state is essentially a semi-peripheral state form then in so far 
as the project succeeds, and the state moves towards the core, it undermines its own 
viability. If we define states by income level it is impossible to consider contemporary 
Korea or Taiwan as part of the semi-periphery (Babones, 2005). Using figures 
adjusted for purchasing power parity, to allow for the fact that both actively intervene 
to suppress the values of their currencies, Taiwan and Korea have per capita GDPs of 
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$46,833 and $36,612 respectively. On the same basis, the figure for the UK is 
$41,499 (IMF, 2015). Although, Taiwan’s export structure remains, in many respects, 
characteristic of a semi-periphery economy with reliance on contract manufacturing 
and low-wages remaining a critical sources of competitiveness (Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, 2013). Korea, despite a lower level of per capita GDP, has higher levels of 
manufacturing wages and has been more successful in developing global brand names 
with greater market power. The statistics regarding the overall level of output of both 
economies are pertinent to this paper’s focus on investment levels. Since the 
publication of Capital in the 1860s radical political economists have been concerned 
with the tendency of developed capitalist economies to generate more capital than 
profitable investment opportunities (Burkett and Hart-Landsberg, 2003: 362-5). In 
this context, the concept of development is a relational one. By modern standards 19th 
century Britain was not a particularly productive economy but Marx (1990) was able 
to consider it as an example of advanced capitalism become of its relational position. 
In relatively underdeveloped economies where capital stock per worker is much lower 
the problems related to capital glut that dog more advanced capitalism do not exist. 
Given access to the world market and a disciplined (subjugated) labour force there is 
almost no limit to the rate of investment that can be sustained. Over time, however, if 
the state moves closer to the core the problem of limited investment opportunities 
emerge.  
An understanding of the developmental state as being compromised by the 
achievement of “development” does not negate Gills’ focus on bilateral US pressures 
or domestic perspectives on the need to globalise. However, it does suggest that the 
developmental state, and the investment-led growth model that underpinned it, could 
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not, in the long-term, have survived irrespective of trade pressures or policymakers’ 
perceptions.  
Finally, the radical literature offers an intensified focus on the position of labour, 
small farmers and women within the developmental state. Both the Korean and 
Taiwanese states are seen to have used their control of agricultural prices to promote 
the movement of workers away from agriculture in order to suppress wage growth in 
the non-agricultural economy (Hart-Landsberg, 1993; Gills, 1999; Minns, 2006). 
Chang (2009: 60-66) argues that the developmental state paradigm largely takes the 
subordination of labour to capital as a given. The real focus is on state-capital 
relations. The Marxist literature instead demands that we place capital-labour 
relations at the forefront of our analysis of the developmental state. Marxist scholars 
have been more consistent than their statist counterparts in highlighting how the 
suppression of the growth of consumption by labour and small farmers was key to 
achieving the phenomenal rates of investment that lay behind rapid growth (Hart-
Landsberg, 1993; Minns, 2006; Chang, 2009).  
 We accept the radical critique of the developmental state paradigm. However, 
the most significant point for us is the areas of convergence between these 
approaches. The key Marxist and statist texts on late development both conceive of 
the developmental state project as involving a profound social/economic 
transformation and a massive state-led mobilisation of resources for investment in key 
strategic industries. Few scholars, statist or Marxist, would contest that the pursuit of 
very high rates of investment was, historically, a core characteristic of the Northeast 
Asian developmental state. 
 When we compare the literature on how the developmental state functioned 
historically with those arguments that stress the resilience of the Korean and 
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Taiwanese developmental state in the contemporary world we see both continuities 
and differences in how the developmental state is defined. The argument that Korea 
and Taiwan remain developmental state draws upon, in different vocabularies, the 
ideas of state capacity and embedded autonomy (Weiss, 2003; Wong, 2005; Chu, 
2007;; Thurbon, 2016). Equally, there is a consistent focus on the role of the state in 
promoting the development of productive capacity in those sectors it defines as 
strategically important. However, there are significant differences in the scale of 
intervention associated with the contemporary and historical Korean and Taiwanese 
developmental state. Korea and Taiwan’s commitment to investing a meaningful level 
of resources in promoting strategically important industries is taken as evidence of 
their continued developmentalism (Amsden and Chu, 2003; Wong, 2005; Kim, 2012 
Thurbon, 2016). This is quite different from historical analysis of the Korean and 
Taiwanese developmental state that understands the entire political economy as being 
shaped by the state’s commitment to maximising investment in strategic sectors. In 
effect we move from a understanding of the developmental state in which the 
effective mobilisation of capital in pursuit of industrial policy is the primary objective 
of the state to one in which it is simply an important objective.  
 This new understanding of the role of industrial/investment policy raises three 
sets of issues. First, in practice all major capitalist states have minimally effective 
bureaucracies, seek to support the development of new technology and offer 
concessionary finance to firms operating in selected industries (OECD, 2016a; 
2016b). Whether or not a state is developmental becomes an impossibly subjective 
question. Second, if we employ stylised state types they are only useful if they 
identify the dominant characteristics of the state. If we understand any state that 
maintains a commitment to promoting the growth of strategic industries as 
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developmental then the usefulness of this concept is undermined. A state may pursue 
strategic industrial policy but an overall assessment of its policy orientation may lead 
us to conclude that is better defined as neo-liberal or social democratic. It only makes 
sense to define a state as developmental if the mobilisation of capital in pursuit of 
industrial policy is the primary objective of the state. Finally, such a broad definition 
of the developmental state tends to obscure the scale of changes that taken place in the 
Korean and Taiwanese political economies. Profound changes in the nature of the 
growth regime, the organisation of finance (the shift to household borrowing) and the 
significance of industrial policy come to be understood as adjustment within the 
developmental state model.  
 We would argue that a meaningful working definition of the developmental 
state must draw upon the key statist and Marxist accounts of late development in 
Northeast Asia. As we have argued, despite key ontological differences both schools 
see the maximisation of investment in selected industries as a central defining 
characteristic of the developmental state. The developmental state commitment to 
maximising rates of investment shaped every aspect of social, economic and political 
life. If we understand a commitment to maximising rates of investment in strategic 
industries as a core characteristic of the developmental state it is clear that 
contemporary Korea and Taiwan cannot be defined as developmental state. The 
structural conditions for the existence of a developmental state, understood in these 
terms, has been eroded by the transition from an environment of capital shortage to 
capital surplus as these economies have developed.  
 
The neo-liberal state 
 
13 
 
The task of defining neo-liberalism is not an easy one. Actually existing neo-
liberalisms bear little resemblance to the visions of neo-liberal scholars. For Peck 
(2012, 7) the neo-liberal state is always in a state of flux because the “utopian vision 
of a free society and free economy is ultimately unrealizable.” Neo-liberalism is 
always a work in progress. Waves of deregulation create instabilities. The state then 
engages in selective re-regulation to address these instabilities. At the same time, neo-
liberalism is always shaped by the political and economic histories of the spaces 
(state, region or urban settlement) to which it is applied (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 
2009).  
 While recognising the complexity of contemporary neo-liberalism if we are to 
employ this concept we must establish its core distinguishing features. An important 
reference point is the literature on depolitisation (Bonefeld 1993). Both the 
developmental and social democratic states engaged in forms of politicised 
development. In very different ways, these states sought to directly intervene in 
labour-capital relations. In line with its twin commitments to maintaining full 
employment and low inflation the social-democratic state sought to control pay 
increases through institutionalised corporatist bargaining. The developmental state 
sought to control labour through direct (often violent) repression of any attempt to 
organise (Chang 2009).  
The neo-liberal state seeks to refrain from direct intervention in labour-capital 
relations and instead seeks to impose discipline through the market. The state 
commits itself to liberalising labour and product markets while maintaining the 
integrity of money, not accommodating inflationary wage settlements through 
monetary policy (Bonefeld 1993). In this environment, the threat of unemployment 
serves to discipline labour and the threat of bankruptcy forces capital to effectively 
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control labour. Perhaps the clearest break in a regime of labour control can be seen in 
the UK where the 1974-1979 Labour government’s policy of seeking to control 
inflation through a series of social contracts was replaced by the Thatcher 
Conservative government’s turn to monetarism and a more than doubling of the rate 
of unemployment (Bonefeld 1993: 137-249). The control of labour through the 
abstract disciplines of the market and money has been buttressed throughout the core 
capitalist world by increasing Central Bank autonomy and the growth of contingent 
forms of employment (Harvey 1990; Jayasuriya 2001). For Korea, Chang (2009) 
argues that as there has been a drawback from the extreme forms of coercion 
associated with the developmental state an increasingly casualised workforce has 
been subject to an intensification of market disciplines.  
While scholars such as Bonefeld and Chang, working within an open Marxist 
tradition, have focused primarily on state-capital relations the concept of 
depoliticisation can be extended to other areas. In the case of the developmental state 
the allocation of credit (capital) and thus intra-capitalist relations were clearly 
politicised (Jayasuriya 2001). This is also true, to a lesser extent, of the major 
advanced capitalist states in the post-war period. Until the 1970s, the British state 
used quantitative limits on specific categories of loans to encourage investment in 
manufacturing industry (Hodgman 1972). The state had concrete goals (for example, 
the maintenance of a particular economic structure) and intervened in the credit 
market to achieve them. The neo-liberal state, on the other hand, confines itself to 
creating regulatory frameworks and allows the market to determine the allocation of 
finance (Jayasuriya 2001). Importantly, regulatory frameworks should not seek to 
preserve or create particular market structures but rather allow competition to 
determine outcomes. Neo-liberalism ought not be reduced to depoliticisation. 
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However, depoliticisation lies at the core of the entire neo-liberal project and a focus 
on depoliticisation is useful in helping us understand processes of financial reform 
and labour market restructuring in Taiwan and Korea.  
We must remain conscious of Peck’s arguments regarding the incomplete 
nature of neo-liberal projects. When we define a state as neo-liberal we are making a 
judgement about its primary characteristics, not seeking to deny complexities or 
contradictions. Every major state employs some form of loan guarantee programme 
for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and direct support for business research and 
development (R&D). While significant support for business R&D in most OECD 
states is less than 0.3% of GDP (OECD 2015a, 59). The median level of government 
loan guarantees across the OECD was only 0.18% of GDP in 2014 (OECD 2016a: 
74). There is no pure neo-liberal state. The question becomes one of scale. States such 
as the UK, Australia and the US conform reasonably well to the neo-liberal model set 
out above in which both capital-labour relations and the allocation of credit are 
marketised/depoliticised.  
The concept of the post-developmental state can provide a useful prism 
through which to consider how neo-liberal reform has interacted with and been 
shaped by the political and economic legacies of the developmental state in Taiwan 
and Korea.  
 
The post-developmental state  
 
The literature on the post-developmental state is more limited than the literature on 
the developmental or neo-liberal state. Our analysis of Korea and Taiwan suggests 
that there are certain core features that former developmental state share that sets 
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them apart from states with different politico-economic histories. For this reason, we 
would argue that there is merit in employing and seeking to further refine the concept 
of the post-development state. At present the concept of the post-developmental state 
is employed in radically different, and incommensurate, ways across the literature on 
contemporary East Asia.  
In certain texts, the post-developmental state is understood as a modernised 
developmental state that has adapted to a changing global environment through 
selective liberalisation but which retains its core commitment to strategic industrial 
policy (Weiss and Thurbon 2006; Uttam 2014). There is also a larger more complex 
and variegated literature that uses the concept of the post-developmental state to 
explore how neo-liberal reform interacts with the legacies of the developmental state 
to create hybrid forms of economic and social governance (Ong 2006; Doucette 2010; 
Chang 2012). This literature argues that within a post-developmental state we may 
expect to find a certain level of policy incoherence. In part, this may reflect the co-
existence of radical neo-liberal reform in certain policy areas with limited change in 
others. At the same time, the institutions of the developmental state may survive but 
come to play a role antithetical to that project- for example state owned banks in 
Taiwan supporting the growth of consumer borrowing. 
Our approach to understanding the post developmental state fits broadly 
within this latter school which stresses its hybridity and incoherence. However, we 
need to be careful when we discuss hybridity in Taiwan and Korea. The allocation of 
capital and capital-labour relations have been largely marketised in both, meaning that 
the essential elements of the neo-liberal project are in place. The developmental state 
is dead. The use of the term “post-developmental state” is not meant to suggest that 
Taiwan and Korea represent some sort of half-way house between developmentalism 
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and neo-liberalism. Rather, we employ the term to explore the form that neo-
liberalism takes in a post-developmental context. The post-developmental state 
maintains a greater commitment to industrial and credit activism than other neo-
liberal states. However, industrial policy now takes the form of significant but 
selective interventions within a marketised/ depoliticised economy. The logics of neo-
liberalism are dominant.  
 Chang (2012) and Doucette (2010) argue that the most significant legacies of 
the developmental state relate to social policy. For these scholars, in former 
developmental state, the primary duty of the government is still understood as being 
to promote high rates of growth and to create an environment where individuals can 
enrich themselves through market exchange. The role of public welfare systems in 
meeting the material needs of citizens remains limited. For both Chang and Doucette 
the post-developmental state combines many of the worst features of neo-liberalism 
and developmentalism. Workers must compete within flexible deregulated labour 
markets without the benefit of adequate social safety nets. For Chang in particular this 
has led to a social crisis with large increases in rates of suicide and social withdrawal. 
We agree with this analysis and take it as a point of departure. As indicated in the 
introduction, we also seek to highlight the macroeconomic issues that the weakness of 
organised labour and low levels of welfare spending cause in both Taiwan and Korea. 
Put simply, by restricting the growth of working class incomes the underdevelopment 
of both welfare systems and the union movement heightens these states’ dependence 
on consumer debt and current account surpluses as sources of demand. 
We return to the question of welfare in the final section of the article. We now 
turn to changes in the organisation of finance, state-capital relations and the nature of 
the growth regime in Taiwan since the 1980s.  
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TAIWAN: A FLEXIBLE AND RESILIENT DEVELOPMENTAL STATE? 
 
Taiwan is frequently presented as the most important example of a developmental 
state that has successfully adapted to the demands of economic maturity and global 
economic change. The state is seen to have limited and controlled the process of 
financial liberalisation (Zhang 2002; Weiss 2003; Chu 2013). In so doing, it 
minimised the potential for instability and ensured that the financial sector remained 
subordinate to the industrial economy. Thurbon (2001: 253-59) argues that the 
financial system is still understood as a support for industrial development. While the 
precise content of industrial policy has changed, for many scholars, there is continuity 
in terms of the state’s commitment to promoting the development of strategically 
important industries (Amsden and Chu 2003; Wong 2005; Weiss and Thurbon 2006). 
This reading of the process of financial reform and the continued significance of 
industrial policy can be questioned. Furthermore, there are a series of issues relating 
to the nature of the growth regime, the economy’s dependence on excessive current 
account surpluses, cross-straits relations and wage stagnation that this literature 
essentially ignores.  
 At the same time, at least superficially, the argument that the state continues to 
play a critical role in mobilising and allocating investment appears viable. Eight of the 
ten largest commercial banks in Taiwan, accounting for over 40% of total deposits, 
remain under government control (Hu 2011, 9).  
This reading of the process of financial reform is undermined when we focus 
on the growing significance of consumer borrowing. By 2013 the stock of loans 
extended to households exceeded loans to the non-financial corporate sector by 47% 
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(Bank of China 2015). Household debt in Taiwan increased from 76% of GDP in 
2002 to 83% in 2014 (Fang 2011, 569; Bank of China 2015, 46). Taiwanese 
household debt is higher, in relative terms, than US debt. According to the Central 
Bank, household borrowing is growing much more rapidly than levels of debt in 
broadly comparable economies (Bank of China 2015, 46). As the 2008 global crisis 
demonstrated this scale of household debt does not simply constitute a problem for 
individual households struggling with debt but threatens the stability of the entire 
economy. The initial trigger for the 2008 crisis was a loss of confidence in the 
capacity of US households to service much lower levels of debt, in relative terms, 
than burden both Taiwanese and Korean household (Mian and Sufi 2011).  
 The importance of the shift from industrial to household finance cannot be 
overstated. The major commercial banks who have historically played a key role in 
supporting industrial investment are now primarily engaged in lending to households. 
This can partially be explained through the growing importance of equity and bond 
financing. However, the changing role of the Taiwanese banking sector is primarily a 
reflection of the overall shift in the demand for funds from the corporate to the 
household sector. The shift to consumer finance undermines the argument that 
changes in the financial system have been limited and that the basic structures of the 
Taiwanese developmental state remain in place. In many ways, the contemporary 
financial system represents the very antithesis of the developmental state system. Vast 
sums of money are channelled into supporting asset price inflation (increasing real 
estate prices) and consumption. Most borrowing has no clear link to the creation of 
new productive capacity. 
 The Taiwanese financial system is neither unambiguously developmental nor 
neo-liberal but contains elements of both systems. On the one hand, finance is 
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increasingly allocated according to price signals. Institutions lend to where they can 
achieve the highest-level of risk-adjusted return. On the other hand, a set of state-
owned institutions remain at its core - albeit a set of institutions whose own behaviour 
is governed by price signals.  
 As we might expect, industrial policy has evolved alongside financial policy. 
Until the second half of the 1980s the state could prioritise the development of 
particular industries through its control over the credit system, the use of state-owned 
firms and heavy tariff protection. As economic liberalisation and the demands of 
global trade regulation made these policies impossible the state is seen, by its 
supporters, to have come to rely on subtler but no less effective forms of intervention 
(Amsden and Chu 2003; Wong 2005; Weiss and Thurbon 2006). For these scholars, 
there is policy change but a basic continuity of objectives. Using public research 
laboratories, the provision of infrastructure such as science parks, subsidies for private 
research, tax incentives and concessionary finance, the state is understood as being 
able to promote the development of effective collaborative research networks in 
strategically important industries (Amsden and Chu 2003: 77-118). 
It is the scale of intervention that is critical in assessing the extent to which 
Taiwan remains a developmental state. If a commitment to industrial policy is a core 
characteristic of the contemporary Taiwanese state than we need to demonstrate that 
the state prioritises this policy in its use of resources. At 0.7% of GDP, public 
spending on supporting R&D is only marginally above the OECD average of 0.67% 
(OECD 2016b). The levels of funding attached to concessionary finance schemes to 
encourage the development of particular sectors are also relatively limited. The six 
flagship industries scheme, the state’s core contemporary industrial promotion 
programme, involves spending approximately 1.4% of GDP over a five-year period 
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(Wang and Lin 2011, 100). OECD states spent a median 0.18% of GDP on 
concessionary finance schemes in 2014. One issue that limits the potential 
effectiveness of concessionary finance schemes is that Taiwan’s most successful 
firms are large-scale net savers with no need for external finance (Directorate-General 
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2015a, 29).  
Because of its history as a developmental state Taiwan maintains a greater 
commitment to industrial activism than most other advanced capitalist states. 
Spending on industrial promotion and supporting R&D is higher than the OECD 
average. However, these are differences of emphasis rather than fundamental 
principles. Levels of support may be higher in Taiwan but they are not of a different 
order of magnitude. In contemporary Taiwan, the allocation of capital is essentially 
determined by price signals rather than official interventions, total public spending on 
concessionary finance programs and supporting R&D is only marginally above 1% of 
GDP (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2015a, 29).  
Analysis of the evolution of the Taiwanese political economy has largely 
ignored the fundamental changes that have taken place in the nature of the growth 
regime. However, changes in rates of investment have played a critical role in shaping 
the restructuring of the financial system, state-capital relations and destabilising the 
Taiwanese economy. Rates of investment have fallen fairly consistently since the 
early 1980s. Investment rates in Taiwan were at their highest from the mid-1970s to 
the early 1980s (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2015a, 41). 
Between 1974 and 1981 investment averaged 32.4% of gross national income. After 
1981 rates of investment fell dramatically. Between 1982 and 1988 investment 
averaged 24% of gross national income. While rates of investment stabilised in the 
1990s, investment has been consistently low since 2001. Gross investment averaged 
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22.4% of national income between 2001 and 2012. Corporate saving has exceeded net 
corporate fixed capital formation every year since 2006 (Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2015a, 29; 39). This remains the case even if we 
consider net foreign direct investment, which averaged 0.8% of GDP between 1996 
and 2012. 1 Furthermore, total corporate saving has exceeded NT$1 trillion every year 
since 2009 – corporate saving had never previously exceeded $1 trillion in 
consecutive years (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2015a, 
29). Major Taiwanese firms are holding vast cash reserves. The fall in rates of 
investment can only be explained in terms of a lack of opportunity for profitable 
investments rather than a lack of finance. Many firms are in a position to increase 
investment without accessing external funding. It is illogical for a profit-maximising 
firm to simply hoard money if relatively safe opportunities for investment exist.  
The investment-led growth model that lay at the heart of the developmental 
state project is not only dead but the body has been cold for some time. With it has 
gone the state’s capacity to use access to finance as a tool through which to steer the 
economy and discipline capital. Equally, the shift away from investment-led growth 
made some form of financial liberalisation and move towards consumer borrowing 
inevitable.  
As an economy moves from the semi-periphery to the core it is 
inevitable/desirable that opportunities for productive investment will decline and that 
there will be a shift towards consumption. However, in Taiwan the decline in 
investment has taken place in an environment where capital has increased its share of 
national output and where wages have been stagnant. Labour’s share of national 
income fell steadily from 54.6% in 1995 to 47.8% in 2011 (Federal Reserve 2015). 
Real wages have been stagnant since the mid-1990s and were lower in 2012 than they 
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had been in 2000 (Financial Times, March 31, 2013; Lim 2014). Inequality has been 
steadily rising since the early 1980s (Zheng 2013). The conditions are not in place for 
a transition to a growth model based on steadily increasing domestic consumption 
supported by consistently rising wages. 
The macro-economic impact of wage stagnation has, at least partially, been 
offset by a fall in levels of household saving. Between 1993 and 2013 the savings rate 
of households declined from 30.74% to 21.08%. We must go back to the mid-1970s 
to find lower overall rates of household saving than we see today (Republic of China 
2015). Furthermore, there is a bi-fracturing of the household sector. Since 2001 the 
savings rate for the poorest 20% of households has, for the first time, been negative - 
in 2014 the poorest 20% of households’ consumption equalled 107% of their 
disposable income (Republic of China 2015). The financial position of poorer 
Taiwanese households is precarious. There are clear limits to the extent to which the 
impact of future wage stagnation on consumption can be offset by reductions in 
savings by the working class. 
The primary mechanism that Taiwan has relied on to maintain growth in the 
face of declining rates of investment has been massive current external surpluses. The 
current account moved from negative to positive in the early 1980s.2 Taiwan’s trade 
surplus with the US increased from US$171 million in 1975, to US$2 billion in 1980 
to over $10 billion in 1985 (Grey 2011, 589). Clearly this was not sustainable. Tsai 
argues that state managers perceived this as a major problem from the mid-1980s 
onwards. According to Tsai (2001, 365) “the really urgent problem (for state 
managers) was an emerging ‘disequilibrium of the macro-economy’—insufficient 
domestic demand, excessive savings, an enormous trade surplus.” Rising exports 
always played an important role in the developmental state. However, until the mid-
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1980s the growth of exports had essentially been matched by the growth of imports. 
The issue that Taiwan faced in the mid-1980s was that the rapid growth of exports 
was no longer being mirrored by similar increases in imports. Taiwan was becoming 
increasingly dependent not simply on trade but a capacity to run chronic current 
account surpluses. Unsurprisingly, Taiwan came under intense pressure from the US 
to reduce its trade surplus.  
Partly because of liberalisation and forced currency appreciation in response 
to US pressure the current account surplus fell sharply after 1988. The macro-
economic effect of which was initially offset by massive fiscal expansion. Public 
spending increased from 23.1% of national income in 1987 to 35.8% in 1992 (Tsai 
2001, 368). Since 2001 Taiwan has once again run consistently large current account 
surpluses. Between 2001 and 2014 Taiwan’s current account surplus averaged 8.4% 
of GDP, over the same period Taiwanese growth averaged 3.9% (IMF 2015). Despite 
increases in consumer debt Taiwan is critically dependent on large external surpluses 
to avoid crisis. Taiwan’s current accounts surpluses are now the product of trade with 
mainland China rather than the US. In 2014 exports, including re-exports, to 
China/Hong Kong came to $127 billion. Imports from China/Hong Kong only came 
to $49.7 billion. Taiwan’s entire $65 billion (12.3% of GDP) trade surplus in 2014 
can be accounted for by trade with China/Hong Kong.3  
Dependence on the mainland Chinese market is, on one level, more 
sustainable than the reliance on the US market. Taiwan has not faced the same 
political pressures from China to reduce its bilateral current account surplus. 
However, China’s relaxed attitude reflects the potential of this surplus, and the 
dependence it represents, to undermine Taiwan’s status as a de facto independent state 
(Grey 2011). The issues caused by Taiwan’s over-dependence on the Chinese market 
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are fully understood by policymakers (The Guardian, May 20, 2016). Taiwan’s 
inability to limit dependence on China must be related to its failure to increase 
domestic demand. It may have been desirable for Taiwan to move towards a 
somewhat more auto-centric economic model following its loss of concessionary 
access to the US market in mid-1980s, However the slow growth of domestic demand 
make a focus on constantly increasing exports unavoidable. Equally, the weak growth 
of domestic demand and the hyper-competitiveness of Taiwanese exports, supported 
by relatively low wages, make Taiwan an unattractive partner for free trade 
agreements with other states (Chiang and Gerbier 2013: 21). Given the weakness of 
domestic demand Taiwan needs unbalanced trade relations – in which exports 
massively exceed imports. Any trade agreements that operate on these terms are 
always likely to be difficult to establish and face political pressures within the deficit 
states. Taiwan’s lack of size perhaps makes a high degree of dependence on trade 
unavoidable. However, it is the weakness of internal demand that lies behind 
Taiwan’s dependence on current account surpluses and the problems that accompany 
this.  
  The evolution of the Taiwanese and Korean economies since the 1980s has, 
in many respects, been very different. Nevertheless, the processes of economic reform 
in both states have been conditioned by the crises in established investment-led 
growth models. The central problems that both economies face, over-dependence on 
current account surpluses and consumer debt, are the products of their failure to 
develop a sustainable alternative growth model. Although the scale and form in which 
they face these issues is far from identical, there are a core set of commonalities. It is 
to the crisis of the Korean developmental state we now turn.  
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THE CRISIS OF THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATE  
 
Partially because of the 1997 economic crisis Korea is understood to have managed 
the process of economic liberalisation in a less judicious manner than Taiwan (see 
Zhang 2002; Wang 2007). Korea allowed a large and lightly regulated non-bank 
financial sector to develop and to have adopted an overly liberal attitude towards 
short-term overseas borrowing from the mid-1990s onwards. Equally significantly, 
the Korean state largely abandoned any attempt to co-ordinate private investment 
after 1993 (Chang, Park and Yoo, 1998). Scholars who maintain that contemporary 
Korea should be understood as a developmental state have argued that the state 
reasserted a commitment to strategic management of the economy after the 1997 
crisis (Lee and Han 2006; Weiss and Thurbon 2006). In a sense Korea is less a 
resilient than a phoenix developmental state. This reading of a Korea that remains a 
developmental state, is undermined by an analysis of changes in the growth regime 
and the basic function of the financial system.  
In contrast to Taiwan, levels of investment in Korea increased throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s. Between 1976 and 1980 investment averaged 31% of GDP. 
According to the IMF levels of investment averaged 32.4% of GDP between 1981 
and 1985, 35.4% between 1986 and 1990, and 39% between 1991 and 1996 (IMF 
2015). On one level, therefore, the investment-led growth model in Korea appeared to 
be vibrant prior to the 1997 crisis. However, Korea was only able to achieve these 
rates of investment by partially suspending the requirement that investment be 
profitable. Between 1970 and 1987 the rate of profit remained at double-digit levels 
and there was no clear overall direction of movement. In 1987 the rate of profit was 
over 13%. After, 1987 the rate of profit fell consistently. In 1996 the rate stood at 
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6.1%. The underlying cause of falling profitability was a rise in the capital-output 
ratio (Jeong 2007, 58-60). This problem was compounded by the partial breakdown in 
systems of labour control after 1986 that allowed labour to increase its share of total 
output (Jeong 2007, 40). Woo-Cumings (2001: 357) sums the situation up well when 
she says, “by 1996 Korea was sustaining one of the lowest profit rates and highest 
rates of investment in East Asia.” This was not sustainable. 
On the eve of the 1997 crisis Korea was in a form of limbo. On the one hand, 
the growth regime was unsustainable and key aspects of the developmental state 
governance model had been swept away. On the other hand, progress in developing a 
neo-liberal regulatory model had been practically non-existent (OECD 1999).  
Since the crisis, major changes have taken place in systems of regulation and 
the nature of the growth regime. There has been an attempt to bring systems of 
financial regulation into line with standards set by the relevant international 
regulatory authorities (OECD 1999, 107-38). Meanwhile, the state actively promoted 
the sale of major domestic financial institutions to foreign investors. Through 
financial re-regulation and the expansion of foreign ownership the state has sought to 
construct a set of financial institutions that would discipline non-financial firms and 
force them to improve profitability.  
The most significant changes to the financial system, from the perspective of 
this article, relate to the flow of funds and increasing foreign ownership of financial 
institutions. The financial system is increasingly orientated towards household rather 
than corporate borrowing. The share of total loans going to the household sector 
increased from less than 25% in 1996 to over 50% in 2006 (Chung 2009, 86). Since 
2006 the growth in household borrowing has consistently outpaced corporate 
borrowing. According to the Bank of Korea, between 2011 and 2014 the growth in 
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lending to households by all financial institutions exceeded the growth in corporate 
lending by 59% (Bank of Korea 2012, 45; 2015, 43). At the same time, bond and 
equity financing has remained limited. The fall in corporate borrowing from financial 
institutions does not reflect financial disintermediation but a sharp decrease in the use 
of external finance by Korean firms.  
Since the 1997 crisis Korean firms have improved their profitability 
moderately and dramatically reduced their levels of investment. Between 1998 and 
2014 levels of investment averaged 31.2% of GDP. If we exclude 1998, to discount 
for the effect of the Asian crisis, this figure rises to 31.5% (IMF 2015). These figures 
represent a return to rates of investment last seen in the second half of the 1970s. 
Throughout modern Korean history investment has played an increasing role in the 
economy. Between 1965 and 1970 investment averaged 21.6% of GDP. Between 
1970 and 1975 the same figure stood at 25.4%. A 31% investment rate in the latter 
half of the 1970s represented a marked increase on what had gone before and the 
maximum level of investment the economy was capable of sustaining. The macro-
economic consequences of a 31% rate of investment are completely different when 
this rate represents a marked decline on what preceded it and where the resources 
clearly exist, as evidenced by levels of corporate saving, to sustain a higher rate.  
Scholars critical of the impact of post-crisis neo-liberal reform have argued 
that the decline in levels of investment is a consequence of this reform (Shin and 
Chang, 2003: 83-129). However, this does not explain why corporate saving in Korea 
is much higher than in other economies where “shareholder capitalism/ neo-
liberalism” is far more embedded and other behaviours associated with this model 
(share buy backs and dividends) are more prevalent. Korean firms hold cash reserves 
equivalent to 33% of GDP. To put this figure in context, American firms hold 
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reserves equivalent to 11% of GDP (The Economist, September 27, 2014). The fall in 
levels of investment in post-crisis Korea reflects the limited availability of relatively 
safe profitable investment opportunities. The long-term decline in the output-capital 
ratio, outlined above, is indicative of a fall in the level of opportunities for profitable 
investment. Pre-crisis rates of investment were artificially inflated by suspending any 
rigorous assessment of the likely profitability of investment. Post-1997 reforms have 
forced firms and financial institutions to seriously assess the profitability of 
prospective investment. The decision of leading firms to hold extraordinary levels of 
liquid financial assets that offer low returns can only be explained by a lack of 
opportunities for more profitable investment. There are real limits to the capacity of a 
relatively mature capitalist economy, such as Korea, to generate opportunities for 
investment. 
These constraints have been compounded by the way capital has sought to 
improve profitability since the 1997 crisis. The output-capital ratio has improved 
marginally since the crisis as firms have invested more selectively (Jeong 2007, 60). 
However, the overwhelming source of improved profitability has been capital’s 
capacity to increase its share of total output at the expense of labour. Between 1996 
and 2012 labour’s share of output fell 13.6%.4 On one level, this is clearly functional 
from the perspective of capital. However, by successfully suppressing wage growth 
Korean firms impaired the prospects of any transition to a consumption-led growth 
model focused on the domestic market. 
Given the decline in the rate of investment and the slow growth of wages we 
may have expected the economy to experience very low growth after 1997. However, 
between 1998 and 2014 growth averaged 4.2% per annum (IMF 2015). While modest 
by historical standards, this represented one of the highest growth rates in the OECD 
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area. Critical to this achievement has been the collapse in household saving and the 
maintenance of sizeable current account surpluses. 
Net household saving fell from 16.4% of disposable income in 1996 to a low 
of 1.1% in 2002.5 Since this point savings have recovered slightly, averaging 5.2% 
between 2002 and 2014. To put these figures in context, between 1986 and 1996 
saving averaged 22.5%. The collapse in net saving has, predictably, been mirrored by 
increases in household debt, which increased from 80% of net disposable income in 
1996 to 161% in 2014 (OECD 2015b). Saving rates for affluent Koreans have 
remained at pre-crisis levels, with the wealthiest 20% of households consistently 
saving between 35% and 45% of their disposable income between 1992 and 2005. 
Savings rates for the poorest 20% of households fell dramatically after the crisis. Prior 
to the crisis savings rates for the poorest 20% of households had been low but 
positive. By 2004 the savings rate for these households was -17% (Chung 2009, 88-
89). While overall levels of saving have increased in recent years poorer Koreans 
continue to accumulate debt. The annual consumption of the poorest 20% of 
households exceeded disposable income by an average of 13.5% between 2010 and 
2014.6 Low income Koreans have responded to wage stagnation by using credit as a 
substitute for non-existent wage increases. The collapse in savings and the growth in 
borrowing among low and middle-income households has allowed for consumption to 
grow more rapidly than wages since the 1997 crisis. 
Since 1997 Korea has become increasingly dependent on external demand and 
its capacity to run permanent current account surpluses. Trade has played a significant 
role in the development of the economy since the 1960s. Nevertheless, historically 
trade played a different role in the Korean developmental state project to the 
Taiwanese, partially because of the different sizes of these states. Korea’s export to 
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GDP ratio in 1996 was 25.7% while Taiwan’s was over 45%. Since the 1997 crisis 
Korea has developed the same intense dependence on exports as Taiwan. By 2014 the 
export to GDP ratio stood at 50.6% (World Bank 2015). Between 1998 and 2014 
Korea ran an average annual current account surplus of 3.1% of GDP (IMF 2015). 
Throughout this period Korea’s bilateral trade surpluses with China/Hong Kong have 
dwarfed those achieved with any other state. Between 1998 and 2014 Korea ran a 
cumulative trade surplus with China/Hong Kong of $721 billion.7 Increasing 
economic integration with China does not pose the same political threat to Korea as 
Taiwan. However, Korea’s over-dependence on export growth and permanent current 
account surpluses leaves it highly vulnerable to any form of regional or global 
turbulence; Korea’s recovery from the global economic crisis was, at least in part, 
driven by its capacity to increase exports to China/Hong Kong by over $35 billion 
between 2009 and 2010. Were China to experience a major economic crisis it is 
difficult to see how Korea could avoid a recession. Korean policymakers have been 
open about the economies excessive reliance on current account surplus/exports but 
have unable to effectively address the issue (Ministry of Finance 2014). 
Korea’s dependence on current account surpluses is not as severe as Taiwan’s. 
The Korean economy has, however, been more dependent on the collapse of domestic 
saving to maintain growth than Taiwan. Taiwan and Korea face many of the same 
issues, stemming from the collapse of investment-led growth regimes. Although 
levels of investment are very different in the two economies, in both cases investment 
has been falling consistently and has lost its capacity to drive economic growth. This 
new environment, where the essential problem is one of capital surplus rather than 
shortage, has led to a fundamental reorientation of the financial system from corporate 
to consumer borrowing. It follows from the arguments set out above, regarding the 
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organisation of finance and the nature of the growth model that Korea, like Taiwan, 
can no longer usefully be categorised as a developmental state. Having said this, the 
legacies of the developmental state continue to shape certain aspects of policy. 
The government continues to manage the development of certain key domestic 
markets, most notably telecommunications, to support product innovation by key 
manufacturers (Y Kim, 2010). The state’s role in promoting collaborative research 
and managing “competition” goes far beyond that we may expect a “normal” neo-
liberal state to play. Korea spends appropriately 1% of GDP on public support for 
R&D, the second highest level in the OECD area (OECD 2016b). 
Korea’s history as a development state is also reflected in contemporary 
systems of industrial finance. In 2013, 9% of all business loans and 12.2% of loans to 
SMEs carried some form of official guarantee. Japan is the only other state in the 
OECD area that makes use of credit guarantees and official financing on a similar 
scale (OECD 2015c, 255). Thurbon (2016: 125-43) takes the extensive use of official 
credit guarantees in contemporary Korea as evidence of the health of the 
developmental state. However, the logics underpinning the contemporary Korean 
state’s interventions in the credit market are very different from those that informed 
the allocation of credit by the developmental state. Credit guarantees are not extended 
to the most dynamic firms. Rather, they are used to support employment within SMEs 
engaged in low value-added activities with limited growth potential and chronic 
profitability problems (OECD 2014). Contemporary interventions in the credit market 
can be a means of managing the problems that the developmental state and 
subsequent processes of neo-liberal reform have created. The uneven relationships 
between SMEs and large firms, which contributes significantly to the weakness of the 
SME sector, can, at least partially, be attributed to the Korean developmental state’s 
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privileging of the chaebol (Woo-Cumings 1991; Hart-Landsberg 1993; Lee 1997; 
Minns 2006). Equally, the turn to consumer finance associated with financial 
liberalisation has compounded the difficulties that SMEs face in accessing credit. 
In both Korea and Taiwan, we see neo-liberal reform interacting with the 
institutional and policy legacies of the developmental state in complex and often 
contradictory ways. In Taiwan, we see state-owned banks turn away from industrial 
towards consumer financing. In Korea, we have seen a similar shift towards consumer 
finance and a retreat from comprehensive industrial policy. At the same time, the state 
continues to play a much greater role in the allocation of credit and actively managing 
the development of selected industries than in other OECD members. In both Korea 
and Taiwan contemporary systems of governance reflect the impact of substantial 
neo-liberal reform and the importance of path-dependency. Korea and Taiwan have 
faced similar issues relating to overdependence on exports, excessive corporate saving 
and sharp rises in consumer debt. The existence of a common set of issues across the 
two states points to the utility of employing the concept of the post-developmental 
state to explore the problems associated with neo-liberal transition in former 
developmental state. Whether we see the legacies of the developmental state in the 
spheres of industrial and financial policy as malign or benign is somewhat subjective. 
The legacies of the developmental state in terms of social policy and capital-labour 
relations are more clearly problematic. It is to these issues we now turn.  
 
LABOUR, SOCIAL WELFARE, OVERACCUMULATION AND THE POST-
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
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Valuable work has been conducted on the social and political impact of neo-liberal 
market reform in a post-developmental context where the welfare state is 
underdeveloped (see, for example, Lim and Jang, 2006; Song, 2009). These scholars 
focus on the obstacles that the political and ideational legacies of the developmental 
state create for the development of an effective social-democratic politics that seeks to 
confront the underdevelopment of welfare systems (Doucette, 2010; Chang, 2012). 
The legacies of the developmental state are seen to interact with neo-liberalism in a 
socially pathological manner. We may build upon this literature in two ways. First, 
while making important political and intellectual points, the literature is often limited 
in terms of its use of concrete data in relation to wages, temporary employment, social 
spending and so on. We seek to ground these arguments empirically. Second, we 
highlight the macro-economic impact of the underdevelopment of welfare structures 
and the weakness of the labour movement. 
From the perspective of Korean and Taiwanese capital the decline in labour’s 
share of national income is a paradoxical phenomenon. On the one hand, the slow or 
non-growth of wages has supported international competitiveness and propped up 
profits. On the other hand, in an economy with limited profitable investment 
opportunities an increase in the proportion of output captured in the form of profits 
will, all other things being equal, reduce effective demand. This is particularly true 
where the leading firms horde cash. Furthermore, in so far as firms use additional 
profits to increase dividends this will disproportionally benefit the richest households 
with the lowest propensity to consume. High levels of wage inequality will limit 
demand for the same reason. A transition to a consumption-led growth model, which 
is not based on an unstainable accumulation of consumer debt, requires strong broad-
based wage growth. 
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As regulation theorists convincingly argue, echoing Marx’s own analysis of 
crises of realisation, excessive high and low wages both have capacity to undermine 
the stability of national capitalisms (Boyer, Uemura and Isogai 2012). Capitalist state 
managers in Korea and Taiwan acknowledge that their economies are over-dependent 
on consumer debt and external demand. The benefits of low wage growth to Korean 
and Taiwanese capitalism are outweighed by the costs. In the long-term, these 
economies are likely to be more stable if the growth regime was based on steadily 
increasing domestic wages. While this may make these economies somewhat less 
competitive internationally it would simultaneously make them less dependent on 
exports. Economic stability is not optimised by maximising international 
competitiveness. While a lack of competitiveness, and the attendant issues with 
current account deficits, can destabilise so can hyper-competiveness based on 
suppressing domestic demand. 
The underdevelopment of welfare systems in Korea and Taiwan exasperates the 
impact of low wage growth on domestic demand. A comprehensive welfare system, 
funded by progressive taxation, effectively transfers income from actors with a lower 
propensity to consume (major firms and wealthy households) to households with a 
high prosperity to consume (the relatively poor).  
It follows from what we argue above that as far as the legacies of the 
developmental state effect the capacity of labour to defend its material interests and 
the development of public welfare systems they have implications for macro-
economic stability. Econometric analysis has highlighted the importance of trade 
union strength and the generosity of the welfare state in accounting for differential 
declines in labour’s share of output across different national economies 
(Stockhammer, 2003). Low levels of independent union membership, the de-
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legitimisation of social democratic parties and the underdevelopment of welfare 
systems in contemporary Korea and Taiwan reflect their histories as developmental 
states (Deyo, 1989; Hart-Landsberg, 1993; Waldner, 1999; Minns, 2006). It is 
impossible, therefore, to understand the inability of the Korean and Taiwanese 
working class to successfully defend their collective interests in the contemporary 
period without reference to the developmental state.  
As discussed above, wages in Taiwan have been largely stagnant since the 
mid-1990s. The underlying causes of wage stagnation may lie in the shift in 
manufacturing to mainland China and deindustrialisation in Taiwan, the limits 
inherent in contract manufacturing, slower economic growth and the end of full 
employment (Chen 2014). At the same time, however, the dominance of “craft 
unions” which have been promoted by the state to administer pensions and health care 
insurance has left workers in a poor position to resist wage stagnation. Analysts of 
Taiwanese labour markets, both domestic and foreign, agree that craft unions cannot 
be defined as unions in the sense that the term is commonly understood (Wang and 
Cooney 2002). Membership of bona fide unions peaked at 700,000 in 1990 (about 
8.3% of workforce) and has since declined. In 2014 only 624,148 employees or 5.4% 
of the workforce were members of non-craft unions (Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics 2015b, 55). Levels of union membership in Taiwan are less 
than a third of the OECD average. The legacies of state repression of independent 
trade unions are reflected in the contemporary weakness of the Taiwanese labour 
movement (OECD 2015c). Furthermore, the lack of an electorally credible social 
democratic party, which reflects the historical exclusion of labour from the 
developmentalist coalition, limits the extent to which labour can seek protection 
through state regulation. Taiwan’s minimum wage did not rise between 1997 and 
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2006.8 At the same time as being impacted upon by the legacies of politicised systems 
of labour control, the Taiwanese working class has had to cope with the end of full 
employment since the mid-1990s, and the strengthening of market (neo-liberal) 
discipline that accompanies this.  
A similar set of arguments can be applied to the development of labour 
markets in Korea. In the post-1997 period labour has failed to prevent the erosion of 
its share of national income in the face of lower economic growth, deindustrialisation 
and a determined offensive by capital. An explanation of this failure must focus on 
the manner in which the legacies of the developmental state project have interacted 
with neo-liberal labour market restructuring. 
The independent trade union movement has played a critical role in modern 
Korean history (Koo 2001). However, the proportion of total workers who were 
unionised peaked at 18.6% in 1989 – the OECD average at the time was 26.3%. 
Because of the construction and maintenance of an exclusionary growth oriented 
political coalition, organised labour in Korea was never able to achieve the policy 
leverage or the broad-based organisational strength that unions enjoyed in other 
states. By 2010 less than 10% of all workers were members of trade unions as 
opposed to an OECD average of 17.6% (OECD 2015c). Korean trade unions have 
experienced similar declines in membership to those in other states but from a lower 
initial starting point. The historical exclusion of labour from the developmental 
coalition is also reflected in the weakness of social democratic politics in 
contemporary Korea.  
The weakness of trade unions and protective labour market regulation are 
common to both Korea and Taiwan. The particular set of policies the Korean 
developmental state pursued created additional problems of labour market bifurcation 
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through its bias towards large firms. Since the late 1980s workers in large firms have 
won significant concessions from capital. In 1980 workers in large firms, with over 
500 employees, earned 7% more than their counterparts in small firms with under 29 
employees (Koo 2001, 206). By 1997 this had increased to 28%. By 2013 the gap 
between wage levels in small and large firms had grown to 39% – the gap between 
workers in large firms and micro enterprises with fewer than 10 employees was 48% 
(Korean Labor Institute 2015). Wage differentials between large and small firms in 
Korea are much higher than in other states with a comparable level of per capita GDP. 
Furthermore, workers in the SME sector are frequently employed on a casual basis. 
According to official figures 21.6% of all workers were employed on a temporary 
basis in 2014 (OECD 2015e). It is worth highlighting that these figures are based on 
workers’ own perception of their employment status. The proportion of workers 
without formal permanent contracts is much higher – between 35% and 55% (OECD 
2004, 89). High levels of de jure temporary employment pre-date post 1997 neo-
liberal restructuring. In 1997 Korea had the highest levels of de jure temporary 
employment in the OECD, with most sources estimating that over 40% of workers 
lacked permanent contracts (Pirie 2008, 184).  
The decomposition of the working class into a core of relatively highly paid 
workers and a larger more precarious employed periphery is frequently seen as a 
characteristic of neo-liberalism (Harvey 1990). In Korea, however, labour market 
polarisation clearly pre-dated the neo-liberal turn. Labour market restructuring after 
the 1997 crisis compounded the problem of polarisation by further expanding the 
periphery. Restrictions on the ability of firms to lay off permanent workers were 
relaxed and there was a sharp rise in the levels of temporary employment (Lee 2002). 
The proportion of workers employed by large firms, with over 300 employees, 
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decreased from 30.7% in 1997 to 12.3% in 2012.9 Decreasing employment in large 
firms was a result of the increasing use of sub-contracting by these firms to take 
advantage of the lower labour costs in the SME sector. An increasing proportion of 
the Korean workforce was directly subject to the disciplines of the market sworn from 
legal protections and the established compromises that labour and management had 
reached within profitable large firms. 
Korea has the second highest proportion of workers earning less than 66.6% of 
median earnings of the 21 OECD states (OECD 2015f). Korea also has the fourth-
highest level of temporary employment in the OECD (OECD 2015d). Labour market 
inequalities in Korea are deeply gendered. Korea has by far the largest gender pay gap 
in the OECD (OECD 2015g). Contemporary gender inequalities reflect the manner in 
which Korean women were incorporated into the developmental state project (Gills 
1999).  
Left-Keynesian economists have argued that the absence of a strong welfare 
state effects labour’s capacity to defend its material position by intensifying the costs 
of unemployment and shaping the overall wage bargaining environment 
(Stockhammer, 2013). The lack of extensive welfare provision sharpens market 
disciplines. The legacies of the developmental state hostility to social spending is 
reflected in contemporary Korea and Taiwan. In 2014 net social spending by central 
government in Taiwan amounted to 3.6% of GDP.10 In 2014 public welfare spending 
in Korea accounted for 10.4% of GDP. Social spending in Korea was less than half 
the OECD average. No other OECD state with a similar or higher per capita income 
spent less than 15.5% of GDP on public welfare (OECD 2015h). 
The impact of neo-liberal reform is always conditioned by pre-existing 
economic and social structures. In states with social democratic traditions, the 
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negative social impact of neo-liberalism is ameliorated by these structures. In Korea 
and Taiwan, the impact of labour market deregulation, casualisation and the 
strengthening of market-based systems of labour control is exacerbated by the 
legacies of repressive, politicised systems of control associated with the 
developmental state. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This article has sought to argue that declines in the rate of investment in Korea and 
Taiwan have been key to the wider restructuring of systems of economic governance. 
A focus on achieving and sustaining high rates of investment lay at the core of the 
developmental state project. However, in so far as the developmental state is 
successful, it undermines the conditions necessary for its continued functioning. 
Developed capitalist economies tend to generate more funds for investment (savings) 
than can be profitably employed by non-financial firms. Financial systems 
increasingly focus on consumer rather than industrial finance. The basic function of 
the financial system changes from facilitating investment to consumption. 
Furthermore, as firms increasingly come to finance investments through internal 
resources the state loses its capacity to discipline firms’ behaviour through access to 
credit. To be sure aspects of the developmental state governance regime remain in 
place but in many cases they no longer function in a coherent manner. So state-owned 
banks in Taiwan primarily focus on consumer rather than corporate finance.  
There are important similarities in terms of the structural changes that 
undermined the Korean and Taiwanese developmental state, the issues that both states 
have faced in adapting to the end of investment-led growth and how the legacies of 
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the developmental state continue to shape contemporary political economy. In 
particular, the repression of labour and the underdevelopment of welfare structures by 
the developmental state have contributed significantly to the problems that both states 
have faced in shifting to consumption-led growth. The overdependence of both 
economies on consumer debt and current account surpluses is a direct product of the 
inability of the domestic working class to defend their material interests. A resolution 
of these problems requires a shift in the balance of class forces. 
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NOTES 
1 Data available from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s 
database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/).  
2 See Republic of China National Statistical Portal for details 
(http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=33339&ctNode=3570&mp=5). 
3 Taiwan’s bilateral trade statistics are available from the Bureau of Foreign Trade 
(http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/). 
4 Labour income share ratios are available from www.stats.oecd.org 
5 All statistics for net aggregate household saving are taken from the OECD’s 
statistics website (http://stats.oecd.org). 
6 See Household Income and Expenditure Trends (http://www.kostat.go.kr/) for more 
details. 
7 All bilateral trade statistics for Korea are taken from the Korean Custom Service’s 
website (http://www.customs.go.kr/) 
8 Data available from the International Labour Organisation’s database  
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/help_home/data_by_country/country-
details/indicator-
details?country=TWN&subject=EAR&indicator=EAR_INEE_NOC_NB&datasetCod
e=YI&collectionCode=YI&_afrLoop=304934363100773#%40%3Findicator%3DEA
R_INEE_NOC_NB%26subject%3DEAR%26_afrLoop%3D304934363100773%26da
tasetCode%3DYI%26collectionCode%3DYI%26country%3DTWN%26_adf.ctrl-
state%3Dsrt3t6kd8_187. 
9 See http://www.smba.go.kr/eng/smes/statistics_01.do?mc=usr0001148 for details. 
10 Data available from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 
(http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=36243&CtNode=6103&mp=2). 
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